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The illusion of choice: Evidence from 
Barcelona  
Caterina Calsamiglia, Maia Güell 07 October 2014  
The Boston mechanism for school assignment is well studied and widely used. This column 
shows two crucial failings of the variation that gives priority based on neighbourhood, using 
an exogenous policy change in Barcelona. Since assignment to any school not picked first is 
unlikely, most parents make the ‘safe’ pick and rank the local school first. Moreover, the 
ability to deviate from the ‘safe’ ranking is greater for richer families, for whom private 
education is a viable outside option. 
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In the last two decades more than two-thirds of OECD countries have augmented families' 
capacity to choose schools for their children beyond those closest to their homes (Musset 
2012).  The aims of school choice are to improve 
 The matching between children and schools; and 
 Students' educational outcomes. 
At the same time, there are equity concerns around school choice – as disadvantaged families 
may be less able to exercise choice. 
Generally, parents are asked to submit a list with their ranking of schools, and then a set of 
rules determines the final allocation – the so-called school choice mechanisms.  One of the 
most widely used procedures in school choice is the Boston mechanism (see Abdulkadiroglu 
2013 for a review). This mechanism assigns all applicants to the school ranked first, and if 
there is overdemand for a school, ties are resolved according to priorities. These priorities can 
be defined through a random lottery or according to criteria such as distance to the school, 
existence of siblings in the school, or other socioeconomic variables. Those rejected from 
their school ranked first can opt for the seats that remain free only after considering 
everyone's school ranked first. This process drastically reduces the chances of being accepted 
in any particular school after being rejected from one's school ranked first. This may lead 
families to avoid overdemanded schools, to avoid rejection from those schools. Priorities for 
residence may seem innocuous, but they can have a large impact on parents' behaviour. They 
may lead families to perceive that the schools for which they have highest priority are safer. 
Recent research 
In Calsamiglia and Güell (2014) we exploit a very rich administrative data set that contains 
all primary school applications in the city of Barcelona, Spain. We observe that in any given 
year, around 80% of families apply for a neighbourhood school.  But by observing parents' 
choices at a point in time, one cannot identify whether this behaviour results from families' 
preferences for the neighbourhood schools or from families applying for a safer school. We 
exploit an unexpected change in the definition of neighbourhood occurring in 2007 to assess 
whether it is preferences or safety that drives parents' school choice. The set of schools for 
which a family has priority changed exogenously with this new definition of neighbourhood. 
Our key insight is that if parents choose according to their preferences, then a change in 
neighbourhood definition should not systematically change their choices. Instead, if parents 
are playing it safe, then a change in neighbourhood definition may affect their choices. 
We focus on families' schools ranked first and find that after the change in neighbourhood 
definition, families avoid applying for the old neighbourhood schools and apply to the new 
neighbourhood schools. In order to illustrate these changes we classify schools for each 
family as follows: 
 Yes-Yes Schools (YY): present in the old neighbourhood and in the new 
neighbourhood. 
 Yes-No Schools (YN): present in the old neighbourhood but not in the new 
neighbourhood. 
 No-Yes Schools (NY): not present in the old neighbourhood but present in the new 
neighbourhood. 
 No-No Schools (NN): not present in the old neighbourhood and not present in the new 
neighbourhood. 
The following picture illustrates this classification for a family living at the corner of the old 
neighbourhood. Diamonds, pentagons, triangles, and hexagons in these graphs represent 
schools. The (orange) building is a particular family/address. The (green) square represents 
the old neighbourhood, and the (purple) circle refers to the new neighbourhood. 
Figure 1. School description for a family living on the corner of the district 
 
If families play it safe, the change in behaviour should be such that they stop ranking first 
schools that are no longer in their neighbourhood. Consequently, the proportion of families 
asking for YN schools should decrease between 2006 and 2007, which is exactly what we 
observe in Table 1. The proportion of families that ask for YN schools fell from 21% to 10% 
– a decrease in demand of 52%. 
Moreover, if families play it safe the change in behaviour should be such that they start 
ranking first schools that are in their new neighbourhood, because these schools now give 
them priority points. Consequently, the proportion of families that ask for NY schools should 
increase between 2006 and 2007, which is exactly what we observe in Table 1. The 
proportion of families that ask for NY schools increased from 9% to 17%, which is an 
increase in demand of 89%. This very large increase indeed suggests that safety, rather than 
preferences, plays a crucial role in choosing a school. 
Table 1. Families’ first choice over the years 
 
This implies that the gains of school choice – in terms of matching of children to schools – 
seem limited, because the equilibrium allocation is not very different from that without 
choice, where children are assigned automatically to their neighbourhood school. 
One important concern in the debate regarding the Boston mechanism is that naive parents, 
being unable to strategise, may be harmed by the system (Pathak and Sönmez 
2008).  Abdulkadiroglu et al (2006) report that in Boston, 19% of parents seem to be naive, 
playing a dominated strategy. We find a similar fraction of parents exhibiting seemingly 
naive behavior in Barcelona. By merging our application data with register data, we can 
rationalise some of their behaviour. Register data allow us to understand how bad the 
outcome is for those taking risks in this game. We find that of those who are unlucky and do 
not get their first-ranked school, 14% of them go to an outside option, mainly private school 
(although only 4% of schools are private in Barcelona), and around 30% do not get any of the 
schools that they ranked. 
We merged our application dataset with the population census data in order to yield 
information about parents' socioeconomic characteristics. Having this information allows us 
to analyse the level of education for these families. Figure 2 shows that those who are 
particularly harmed by the system – those who do not get any of the schools  ranked in their 
application – have systematically lower levels of education than those applicants who do not 
take any risk. Similarly, those with higher levels of education can take higher risk and 
therefore have greater access to the best schools in the city. 
Concluding remarks 
Our empirical evidence suggests that under the Boston mechanism, important inequalities 
emerge, because the mechanism provides those who can afford private school with an outside 
option that allows them to play a riskier strategy in the public assignment and have a better 
chance of getting the best schools in the public system. 
Figure 2. Household education and final outcome 
 This paper shows that with the Boston mechanism, priorities overtake the role of preferences 
for most applicants. The risk involved in stating preferences is not worth taking, leading most 
of the applicants to apply for one of the neighbourhood schools, independently of the identity 
of those schools. Only the few families who have the option of private school if they are 
unhappy with their allocation can take the risk of stating their preferences. Those who dare to 
take risks without having an outside option are particularly harmed by the system – which 
rationalises why most families do not take risks. 
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